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Perspective

Early response to COVID-19 in the
Philippines
Arianna Maever L. Amit,a,b Veincent Christian F. Pepitoa,b and Manuel M. Dayritb
Correspondence to Arianna Maever L. (email: alamit@up.edu.ph)

Low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) with weak health systems are especially vulnerable during the COVID-19
pandemic. In this paper, we describe the challenges and early response of the Philippine Government, focusing on travel
restrictions, community interventions, risk communication and testing, from 30 January 2020 when the first case was
reported, to 21 March 2020. Our narrative provides a better understanding of the specific limitations of the Philippines
and other LMICs, which could serve as basis for future action to improve national strategies for current and future public
health outbreaks and emergencies.

THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH SYSTEM AND
THE THREAT OF PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES

D

espite improvements during the past decade,
the Philippines continues to face challenges
in responding to public health emergencies
because of poorly distributed resources and capacity.
The Philippines has 10 hospital beds and six
physicians per 10 000 people.1,2 and only about
2335 critical care beds nationwide.3 The available
resources are concentrated in urban areas, and rural
areas have only one physician for populations up to
20 000 people and only one bed for a population of
1000.4 Disease surveillance capacity is also unevenly
distributed among regions and provinces. The primary
care system comprises health centres and community
health workers, but these are generally ill-equipped
and poorly resourced, with limited surge capacity, as
evidenced by lack of laboratory testing capacity, limited
equipment and medical supplies, and lack of personal
protective equipment for health workers in both primary
care units and hospitals.5 Local government disaster
preparedness plans are designed for natural disasters
and not for epidemics.
Inadequate, poorly distributed resources and capacity nationally and subnationally have made it difficult
to respond adequately to public health emergencies in

the past, as in the case of typhoon Haiyan in 2013.6
The typhoon affected 13.3 million people, overwhelming the Government’s capacity to mobilize human and
financial resources rapidly to affected areas.7 Failure
to deliver basic needs and health services resulted in
disease outbreaks, including a community outbreak of
gastroenteritis.8 Access to care has improved in recent
years due to an increase in the number of private hospital beds;5 however, improvements in private sector
facilities mainly benefit people who can afford them, in
both urban and rural areas.
In this paper, we describe the challenges and early
response of the Philippine Government, focusing on
travel restrictions, community interventions, risk communication and testing, from 30 January 2020 when
the first case was reported, to 21 March 2020.

EARLY RESPONSE TO COVID-19
Travel restrictions
Travel restrictions in the Philippines were imposed
as early as 28 January, before the first confirmed
case was reported on 30 January (Fig. 1a).9 After the
first few COVID-19 cases and deaths, the Government
conducted contact tracing and imposed additional
travel restrictions,10 with arrivals from restricted countries subject to 14-day quarantine and testing. While
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Fig. 1a.
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Timeline of key events and developments in the Philippines, 30 January–21 March 2020
Travel restrictions
Hubei Province, China

Mainland China, Hong Kong SAR (China), Macau SAR (China)
Taiwan (China)
Republic Korea (select areas)

Community interventions
Flexible work arrangements
Prohibition of mass gatherings
Suspension of classes
Metro Manila under ECQ
ECQ extended to entire Luzon

Testing
Ramping up of testing capacity
Field testing of local test kits
01 Feb 2020
Community transmission reported
in the Philippines

15 Feb 2020
Declaration of state of public
health emergency

travel restrictions in the early phase of the COVID-19
response prevented spread of the disease by potentially
infected people, travellers from countries not on the
list of restricted countries were not subject to the same
screening and quarantine protocols. The restrictions
were successful in delaying the spread of the disease
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only briefly, as the number of confirmed cases increased
in the weeks that followed.11 Fig. 1b shows all interventions, including travel restrictions undertaken before 6
March, when the Government declared the occurrence
of community spread, and after 11 March, when WHO
declared COVID-19 a pandemic.
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Fig. 2.
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Provinces placed under enhanced community quarantine (ECQ). (2a) The Government declared ECQ in
Metro Manila effective 15 March 2020; (2b) The Government declared ECQ on the entire island of Luzon
effective 17 March 2020.
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Community interventions
The Government declared “enhanced community quarantine” (ECQ) for Metro Manila between 15 March and
14 April (Fig. 2a), which was subsequently extended
to the whole island of Luzon (Fig. 2b). The quarantine
consisted of: strict home quarantine in all households,
physical distancing, suspension of classes and introduction of work from home, closure of public transport
and non-essential business establishments, prohibition
of mass gatherings and non-essential public events,
regulation of the provision of food and essential health
services, curfews and bans on sale of liquor and a
heightened presence of uniformed personnel to enforce
the quarantine procedures.12 ECQ – an unprecedented
move in the country’s history – was modelled on the
lockdown in Hubei, China, which was reported to have
slowed disease transmission.13 Region-wide disease
control interventions, such as quarantining of the entire
Luzon island, were challenging to implement because
of their scale and social and economic impacts, but
they were deemed necessary to “flatten the curve” so
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that health systems were not overwhelmed.14 While the
lockdown implemented by the Government applied only
to the island of Luzon, local governments in other parts
of the country followed this example and also locked
down. The ECQ gave the country the opportunity to
mobilize resources and organize its pandemic response,
which was especially important in a country with poorly
distributed, scarce resources and capacity.

Risk communication
The Government strengthened and implemented national risk communication plans to provide information
on the new disease. The Government conducted daily
press briefings, sponsored health-related television and
Internet advertisements and circulated infographics on
social media. Misinformation and conspiracy theories
about COVID-19 were nevertheless a challenge for a
population that spends more than 10 hours a day on the
Internet.15,16 These spread quickly and became increasingly difficult to correct. Furthermore, the Government’s
messages did not reach all households, despite access
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to health services and information, resulting in limited
knowledge of preventive practices, except for handwashing.17

ness, surveillance and testing capacity in particular is
a lesson that the Philippines and other LMICs should
learn from COVID-19.

Testing

Acknowledgements

Testing is key to controlling the pandemic but was done
on a small scale in the Philippines. As of 19 March,
fewer than 1200 individuals had been tested,11 as only
the Research Institute for Tropical Medicine located in
Metro Manila performed tests and assisted subnational
reference laboratories in testing.18 No positivity rates
for RT-PCR tests were reported until early April 2020.
Because of the limited capacity for testing at the start
of the pandemic, the Department of Health imposed
strict protocols in order to ration testing resources while
ramping up testing capacity. Most tests were conducted
for individuals in urban areas, where the incidence was
highest.19

None

CONCLUSIONS
At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the country’s
initial response lacked organizational preparedness
to counter the public health threat. The Philippines’
disease surveillance system could conduct contact
tracing, but this was overwhelmed in the early phases
of outbreak response. Similarly, in February, only one
laboratory could conduct reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT–PCR) testing, so the country
could not rapidly deploy extensive laboratory testing
for infected cases. In addition, the primary care system
of the Philippines did not serve as a primary line of
defence, as people went straight to hospitals in urban
areas, overwhelming critical care capacity in the early
stages of the COVID-19 pandemic.
In response to the early phase of the pandemic,
the Government of the Philippines implemented travel
restrictions, community quarantine, risk communication
and testing; however, the slow ramping up of capacities
particularly on testing contributed to unbridled disease
transmission. By 15 October, the number of confirmed
cases had exponentially grown to 340,000 of which
13.8% were deemed active.11 The lack of pandemic
preparedness had left the country poorly defended
against the new virus and its devastating effects. Investing diligently and consistently in pandemic prepared-
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